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Abstract We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insur-
ance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on
their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating
in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks,
all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, “subsidize” insurers.
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If the legislation is sufficiently stringent the equilibrium is pooling, all insurers just
break even and low risks subsidize high risks. None of these results require resorting
to non-Nash equilibrium notions.
Keywords Health insurance · Mandatory enrollment · Minimum coverage
regulation · Asymmetric information · Market equilibrium · Cross-subsidization
JEL Classification I13 (Health Insurance, Public and Private) · D82 (Asymmetric
and Private Information, Mechanism Design)
1 Introduction
A widespread regulation in the private health insurance industry is the existence of a
minimum standard, which puts a lower bound on the coverage that can be offered to
agents in different services. Most states in the US consider legal mandates for health
insurance in the individual and small group markets.1 Importantly, there are large dif-
ferences in both the number of mandates across states and their estimated cost. Figure 1
depicts these facts and is based on Keating (2011) and Bunce and Wieske (2008).2 How
stringent the legislation should be is of a great importance since US authorities have
to establish the minimum standards nationwide as signed in the federal legislation.
As it turns out, this regulation comes at the expense of low risks. Hence it is often
accompanied by mandatory enrollment laws, whereby all individuals are forced to
pick one of the outstanding contracts in the market. This indeed is the case in Patient
Protection and Accountable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA)3 that is in the process of
implementation at the time of writing this paper.
One of the arguments for such regulation is the underprovision of coverage for a
large segment of the population. This phenomenon can be caused by several reasons,4
but here we focus on the presence of asymmetric information between insurers and
insurees, an issue that has attracted a great deal of attention for more than thirty years.
Since the seminal work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (henceforth RS), it is well
known that when individuals have privileged information on their own health risks,
the market will respond by providing a set of contracts, one intended for low risks
with low coverage and low premium, and the other contract intended for high risks
with full coverage and high premium.
1 This regulation does not apply to health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organi-
zations (PPOs), or self-funded large group markets. Similar regulations are imposed in European countries
with a sizable private sector in health insurance, such as Germany and the Netherlands, or in some sectors
like civil servants in Spain. However, in these cases the individual does not directly pay an out-of-pocket
premium to the insurer. Instead, individual contributions go to a common fund that is then used to pay health
plans on a risk-adjusted/per-enrollee basis (capitation).
2 This paper does not seek the causes of the heterogeneity, but to study consequences of this pervasive
regulation.
3 Commonly, “Obamacare”. The minimum coverage takes the form of the so called the Bronce Plan,
characterized by a maximum deductible of $2000 and a 50 % of maximum coinsurance.
4 Ex ante or ex-post moral hazard, consumers’ misperceptions of risk, performance risk, and so on. See
McFadden et al. (2012) for a review.
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Fig. 1 Mandates and cost heterogeneity across States in the US
The fact that high risks are forced to pay a high premium is seen as unfair to many
analysts and regulators. Hence, many researchers have been devoted to find ways to
regulate this market in order to implement some degree of cross-subsidization. An
extreme form of such cross-subsidization is present in a pooling equilibrium, where
all risks obtain the same coverage at the same premium, regardless of their risk.5 RS
also showed that no such pooling equilibrium can exist in the absence of regulation,
since one of the insurers can profitably deviate by offering a contract with a slightly
cheaper premium and lower coverage, which will only attract the low risks. This action
is labeled as “cream skimming” (also known as “cherry picking”).
Our aim is to determine whether a minimum coverage legislation (henceforth MCL)
can implement some degree of cross-subsidization among different risks. The idea is
that undesirable cream skimming deviations might be ruled out through such legis-
lation. As mentioned above, since cross-subsidization comes at the expense of low
risks, such legislation is often accompanied by mandatory enrollment laws.
Using the model of RS as a benchmark, we show that the effects of MCL drastically
depend on how demanding this regulation is. In a nutshell, our main result is that a
weak MCL could bring an unexpected result. Namely, insurers might increase their
profits while all types of individuals might be worse off. In other words, a weak MCL
may result in individuals subsidizing the insurers rather than low-risks subsidizing
high-risks. In contrast, a sufficiently stringent MCL can indeed restore the desired
cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks while all insurers make zero profits.
5 This is conditional on risk class. A risk class is the set of individuals sharing the same value of their
observable characteristics used to underwrite contracts (usually demographics such as age and gender).
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We focus on single contract competition as evidence suggests that it may be difficult
for a single insurer to implement a perfect screening menu by itself. We do not claim
that single contract competition holds in every market, but that there is evidence for
this being an accurate description in some markets. We provide empirical support for
this assumption in Sect. 5.
Regarding the relevant literature, the closest paper to ours is by Neudeck and Pod-
czeck (1996) (henceforth NP). They were the first authors to point out that a weak MCL
could have perverse effects. However, our analysis and results differ from theirs in
several respects. First and foremost, their results are less dramatic than ours. Namely,
they focused on an equilibrium where only insurers attracting low risks make positive
profits (p. 400), whereas we show existence of an equilibrium where all insurers make
positive profits and all individuals are worse-off –even the high risks– as compared to
the laissez faire. Second, their result is based on the use of a non-Nash equilibrium
notion, namely, Grossman Equilibrium, a point that we return to below, whereas we
stick to the Nash concept.6 Finally, their prediction on the equilibrium market struc-
ture is quite imprecise. Except from exhibiting a separating equilibrium, there is no
prediction regarding how many insurers are offering each contract in the separating
set. In contrast, we are able to predict a unique market structure that is fully spelled
out below.7
The comment on NP by Encinosa (2001) also focuses on MCL. Instead of Gross-
man’s equilibrium notion, he takes two independent routes to restore equilibrium. The
first one is to use the so-called Wilson–Miyazaki–Spence (WMS) equilibrium notion.8
The second one is to stick to the Nash equilibrium notion but assume that (i) insurers
offer contracts in a limited amount (or “capacity”, in his terminology) and that (ii)
there is a sufficiently large proportion of high risks in the population.9 He concludes
that, under both alternatives, there is a menu equilibrium that is second best and where
insurers make zero profits. We prefer to stick to the Nash equilibrium notion and not
assume any capacity constraints.
Let us now present our results in detail. We make two working assumptions. First,
an exogenous number of insurers strictly larger than 2 serve this market.10 Second, the
6 Many other papers have abandoned the Nash equilibrium notion in order to formulate predictions in a
model where insurers are allowed to offer menus of contracts. Indeed, as shown by Encinosa (2001), a Nash
equilibrium fails to exist under a weak MCL if insurers are allowed to offer menus.
7 Another difference between our analysis and NP’s (and the rest of the literature for that matter) lies in the
interpretation of “minimum mandates”. Namely, NP assume that this regulation implies the restriction that
coverage and premia are such that all individuals attain a minimum level of welfare in the event of illness.
We consider that only the coverage is regulated under MCL. We show in Appendix C that our results also
hold in this other case.
8 See Encinosa (2001) for details. The equilibrium menus under a MCL involve cross-subsidization. Such
cross subsidization can be supported using WMS equilibrium because if a insurer drops the loss-making
contract it induces losses on the rest, who automatically withdraw their contracts.
9 Intuitively, when a insurer drops the contract aimed at attracting the high risks (which is the contract that
makes losses), the high risk individuals that are left without a contract randomly choose a contract among
those contracts that remain outstanding. Hence the deviating insurer ends up serving some high risks at his
contract aimed at low risks, which imposes large losses on that insurer. See Appendix A in Encinosa (2001).
10 If the market is served by a (specialized) duopoly, that is, a single insurer offers the contract aimed
at the high risks and a single insurer offers the contract aimed at the low risks, the equilibrium becomes
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proportion of low risks is below the threshold for existence in the RS model, which
we refer to as the RS threshold. This ensures existence of a laissez faire equilibrium.
As in RS, we have a two stage game. In the first stage, insurers offer their contracts
simultaneously. In the second stage, individuals choose one of the outstanding con-
tracts in the market. By backward induction, once the optimal choice by individuals
among any possible profile of contract offers has been determined, we use the Nash
equilibrium notion to find the equilibrium set of contracts. Hence, we do not restrict
deviations by an insurer to be robust to further deviations by other insurers.11 Also,
unlike Grossman’s notion, we do not allow insurers to withdraw contracts that were
previously offered.12
In the absence of a binding MCL, the standard separating equilibrium of RS arises.
As soon as the MCL becomes binding, there exists an open set of parameter values
such that there exists an equilibrium where all insurers make identical strictly positive
profits. This equilibrium is still separating and coexists with the equilibrium studied
by NP for any given vector of parameter values in the aforementioned open set. In
both equilibria, a single insurer, which we name “the scapegoat” for reasons that will
become clear below, attracts all the high risks in the population while the rest of insurers
“free ride” on the scapegoat to obtain profits at least as large as the scapegoat’s. In the
NP equilibrium, the high risks enjoy the same contract as under laissez faire, which
in turn coincides with the one that obtains under symmetric information. In the new
equilibrium that we find, the high risks enjoy the same coverage as under laissez faire
but pay a higher premium. Hence the scapegoat obtains positive profits as well.
In contrast, if the MCL is sufficiently demanding, then a pooling equilibrium, where
all insurers offer the same contract, is the only possible equilibrium. In this equilibrium
all insurers make zero profits and the desired cross-subsidization from high to low risks
is attained. Obviously, as compared to the laissez faire, low risks are worse off and
high risks are better off. Notice however that the low risks are always worse-off no
matter how stringent the MCL is.
The intuition for the result arising under a weak MCL is the following. The same
legislation that impedes cream skimming deviations also has a severe anti-competitive
effect. Suppose all free riders make positive profits. A free rider trying to undercut
his free-rider rivals can only do so by decreasing his premium, due to the MCL. This
breaks separation and the deviation becomes unprofitable. What is new in our analysis
is the following additional intuition. Suppose that the scapegoat also enjoys positive
profits. Obviously, he is not going to undercut himself. If he tries to undercut the free
riders then again separation is broken and the deviation becomes unprofitable. Lastly,
Footnote 10 continued
undetermined, as pointed pout by Villeneuve (2003). The idea is that the low-risk’s incentive compatibility
constraint at the contract aimed to the low risk is not binding, so a voluntary participation constraint would
have to be imposed to close the model. Existence of an equilibrium after imposing such a constraint is still
an open question.
11 In Wilson’s notion, insurers who make losses after a deviation are allowed to withdraw their contracts.
In Riley’s notion, potential insurers who could make profits after an incumbent’s deviation are allowed to
offer a new contract.
12 In Grossman’s notion, insurers who have learned the type of the individual by her choice of contract
are allowed to withdraw the contracts that would yield losses.
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we need to ensure that a free rider does not want to undercut the scapegoat. Hence our
result that in equilibrium, each free rider obtains no less profits than the scapegoat.
This (perhaps) justifies our terminology.
To sum up, our contribution is two fold. First, we are able to sustain the equilibrium
studied by NP without having to resort to non-Nash equilibrium notions. Interestingly,
this allows us to be much more precise in our prediction of the market structure that will
arise. Second, we show that this market structure is compatible with other equilibria
where also the insurer serving the high risks makes positive profits.13
We have also analyzed a variation of the game described above where a large set of
potential insurers, in the first stage of the game, not only choose their contract but also
whether to offer a contract at all. If they do offer a contract they must bear some fixed
(entry) cost.14 Hence the number of insurers becomes endogenous. Unfortunately, in
such a model, Nash Equilibria in the entry stage never exist under laissez faire. Inter-
estingly, however, introducing a MCL may allow for the existence of such equilibria.
The idea is that, as mentioned above, there exists a middle range of MCL where a
finite number of insurers obtain positive (variable) profits. This allows these insurers
to recover the entry costs and it is possible to sustain an equilibrium that is separating
with the structure described above (one scapegoat and at least two free riders).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the game and the equi-
librium notion and we present the benchmark case of RS. In Sect. 3 we solve the
game. In Sect. 4 we introduce the game where insurers choose whether to enter or
not and sustain equilibria for a range of minimum coverage levels. Section 5 presents
empirical evidence supporting our model. Section 6 concludes. Proof of all lemmas
and propositions are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
The model of RS is our benchmark. Suppose a population of risk averse individuals
who are identical except in their probability of falling sick that is private information.
The probabilities have two possible values: pH and pL with 0 < pL < pH < 1 and
the subpopulations are named high-risks and low-risks accordingly. The share of the
low risk types in the population is public knowledge and denoted by 0 < λ < 1.
Consequently, the average probability p¯ is given by p¯ = (1 − λ)pH + λpL .
As it is customary in the literature, we use the final wealth representation to derive
our results and present figures. Let s and n be the final wealth if the individual is sick
and healthy respectively. The expected utility function V i of type i ∈ {L , H} is given
by V i (s, n) = (1 − pi )U (n) + piU (s) with U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0. The marginal
rate of substitution for type i is given by:
13 Note that other regulations can restrict profits of insurers, ruling out some of the equilibria with profits
above the legal limit. For example, Affordable Care Act put a cap on profits. We thank a referee for pointing
this out.
14 Encinosa and Sappington (1997) analyze the nature of competition between two HMOs bearing asym-
metric fixed costs. They consider both the level of preventive care and the level of treatment. Hence their
model constitutes a very important departure from RS model. We prefer to stick to RS as much as possible.
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MRSi =
∂V i
∂n
∂V i
∂s
= (1 − pi )
pi
U ′(n)
U ′(s)
.
A contract C is defined by its coverage c and premium ˜P . The insurer is risk neutral
and the expected profit given by a general contract C with a risk-type i individual is
(1 − pi )˜P + pi
(
˜P − c) = ˜P − pi c.
Becoming sick is represented by a loss in wealth  > 0 relative to initial wealth
w > 0. Thus, the future states of the world for an uninsured individual are n = w if
remains healthy and s = w−  if he becomes sick. We refer to the uninsured situation
as the status quo point and is denoted by A.
We perform the usual change of variable to express contracts in the space of final
wealth (n, s).15 If an individual has purchased a contract (˜P, c), his final wealths are
either s = w−− ˜P+c or n = w− ˜P . Notice that these two scenarios are independent
of the individual’s risk type.
Using the expressions above, an insurer offering a contract associated to (n, s) to a
type i individual expects to obtain a profit per capita equals to:
πi (n, s) = w − n − pi (s − n + ) . (1)
Similarly, an insurer attracting an unbiased mix of both risk types expects to obtain:
π¯(n, s) = w − n − p¯ (s − n + ). (2)
Thus, isoprofits associated to an individual of type i = L , H have slope ds/dn =
−(1 − pi )/pi in the (n, s) space. It is easy to check that the zero isoprofit line goes
through status quo point A. The zero isoprofits associated to each type are depicted in
Fig. 2 as two straight lines.
As proven by RS, the equilibrium outcome under symmetric information is given
by the contracts H∗ (for high risks) and L∗ (for low risks) in Fig. 2, where attracting
a single risk-type yields zero profits and contracts are efficient, that is, both contracts
offer full insurance (ni = si for i = L , H ).
Of course, the high risks would be better off if they could have the contract intended
for low risks. This is the basic nature of the adverse selection: some agents have the
incentives to hide their type.
As also proven by RS, the only possible equilibrium under asymmetric information
has two separating contracts
{
H∗, LRS
}
being offered in the market. Contract H∗ has
high-premium-high-coverage, intended for the high risk type; while contract LRS has
low-premium-low-coverage and is intended for the low risk type. Denote the coverage
of the latter contract by cRSL .
Formally, the two separating contracts
{
H∗, LRS
}
are determined by four equations,
namely, zero expected profits for insurers offering LRS and for insurers offering H∗,
full insurance at H∗, and binding incentive compatibility constraint for the high-risks.
Mathematically,
15 See Appendix A for details.
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s 
n 
45º 
H*
VH*
VL*
A
L*
Fig. 2 The equilibrium under symmetric information
πL (nL , sL) = 0; (3)
πH (nH , sH ) = 0; (4)
sH = nH ; (5)
V H (nH , sH ) = V H (nL , sL). (6)
The two contracts are depicted in Fig. 3, where pL = 1/5 and pH = 4/5, so the
slopes of the corresponding zero isoprofits are −4 and −1/4 respectively.
One important insight of RS is that equilibrium does not exist if the proportion
of low risks λ exceeds a threshold denoted by λRS . The threshold ensures that the
indifference curve of the low-risks at LRS does not cross the zero isoprofit line of the
fair pooling contracts, which we denote by π P ( = 0), where  represents the total
profits obtained by an insurer.
2.1 The game and the equilibrium notion
Suppose there are N individuals in this market. The set of insurance providers is
exogenously given and denoted by  = {1, 2, . . . , k, . . . , M}. The only feature that
can distinguish two insurers in the eyes of a consumer is the contract it offers (no ex-ante
differentiation). The game has two stages. In Stage 1, each insurer k ∈  decides which
contract, Sk = (nk, sk) ∈ 2+, to offer. All insurers take this decision simultaneously.
Contract offers cannot be withdrawn later on and all individuals choosing a contract
must be accepted (open enrollment). Let  = {S1, S2, . . . Sσ } be the set of different
outstanding contracts. The set of all possible such sets is denoted as . In Stage 2, all
consumers observe the set  ∈ . Each individual then picks a firm. We make the
following assumptions.
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s
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A
H*
LRS
L=0
V(H*) 
VL(LRS) 
H = 0
P(  =0) 
L’
VL(L’) 
Fig. 3 The equilibrium under asymmetric information. Notes: In Definition 1 we characterize a competitive
nash equilibrium (CNE). CNE contracts are {H∗, LRS}. The candidate {H∗, L ′} is not an equilibrium even
if only Firm 1 offers H∗ and only 2 firms offer L’. One of the latter gains by deviating to the shaded area
Assumption 1 Suppose contracts
{
Si1 , Si2 . . . , Si f
} ⊂  are the best (and therefore
indifferent) for individual I .16 Then I will choose a firm offering the contract in
{
Si1 , Si2 . . . , Si f
}
, say Si∗ , with most coverage.17
Assumption 2 Suppose M ′ ≤ M firms offer contract Si∗ as described in Assump-
tion 1. Then individual I will choose one of these firms randomly. Hence, each of
these M ′ firms has a 1/M ′ probability of attracting that individual.
Assumption 1 is also implicitly imposed by RS.18 Assumption 2 is consistent with
the absence of ex-ante differentiation.19 Notice also that firms only care about the
16 Even if contracts S and S′ in  are different, they may bring the same expected utility to a given type
of individual.
17 Contract Si∗ is unique. Suppose that two contracts are indifferent for the individual and that the two con-
tracts provide the same coverage. Then the two contracts are simultaneously placed in the same indifference
curve and at the same vertical distance to the 45◦ line. Hence the two contracts must be the same.
18 In RS, the reason to assume this is two-fold: on the one hand, the incentive compatibility constraint
for the high risks is binding. On the other hand, all contracts lead to zero profits. If, out of indifference
between a full insurance contract A (aimed to attract high risks) and a partial insurance contract B (aimed
to attract low risks), a high risk individual would choose the latter with any positive probability, then such
choice would entail loses (in expectation) for the firm offering B. Given such response in the second stage,
no firm would offer contract B in the first stage. What other equilibria might emerge in our framework if
Assumption 1 is relaxed is beyond the scope of this work. Moreover, relaxing Assumption 1 would make
our analysis quite different from, and difficult to compare with, that of RS. Assumption 1 is, in any case,
standard in the literature. See for instance Smart (2000), p. 157.
19 We provide some discussion on the consequences of relaxing this assumption after Proposition 1 below.
Nonetheless this assumption is standard in the literature, see Smart (2000), p 157.
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profits that a given type of individual brings-in given the contract offered. Therefore,
for any given , it suffices to describe which firm offers which contract and the number
of individuals of each type that each firm attracts. We do so by means of a function
g :  →  × N2. This function assigns, to each insurer k in , one of the contracts
Sk in  and two natural numbers: the number of individuals of type L and the number
of individuals of type H that will accept insurer k’s contract. We now introduce our
equilibrium concept.
Definition 1 Given any pre-specified set of insurers , we say that the pair
{
∗, {g}∈
}
constitutes a Competitive Nash Equilibrium (CNE) if
(i) (Second stage) For every possible set  ∈ , function g is consistent with
individuals choosing one of their best contracts in  as well as Assumptions 1
and 2.
(ii) (First stage) Given the best response by individuals for each possible set of con-
tracts, no insurer in , by unilaterally offering a contract S′ /∈ ∗, can obtain
larger profits than in {∗, g∗}.
Notice that we are assuming a compulsory insurance scheme. Thus, we do not
include a voluntary participation constraint in our model.
2.2 Recasting RS
We cast the results in RS using our definition. We will incorporate the minimum
coverage legislation in Sect. 2.4. Due to the constant returns to scale, the equilibrium
can be sustained with M ≥ 3 number of insurers offering any of the two contracts
as long as at least 2 offer contract LRS . In our notation, the CNE is given by (i)
∗ = {H∗, LRS}, (ii) any partition of  into two subsets L and H with the only
constraints that |L | ≥ 2 and that |H | ≥ 1, and (iii) g∗ (i) =
(
H∗, 0, (1−λ)N|H |
)
for all i ∈ H and g∗ (i) =
(
LRS, λN|L | , 0
)
for all i ∈ L . We say that this is an
equilibrium with full specialization (Olivella and Vera-Hernandez 2010).
Lets us explain the requirement of three or more insurers (M ≥ 3) through an
example of profitable deviations with two insurers that are ruled out with three insurers
and easy to generalize for M > 3.20 If there are only two insurers (M = 2), the RS
equilibrium is not robust to a deviation by the insurer offering the contract LRS .
This deviation consists in raising the premium of LRS . Incentive compatibility (IC) is
preserved (since the low risk IC constraint was slack at LRS) and there is no rival also
offering LRS to rule out this deviation.
We now show why an equilibrium with positive profits cannot be sustained with
M = 3. Consider for instance the pair of contracts {H∗, L ′} depicted in Fig. 3. One
insurer, say insurer 1, offers contract H∗ and the rest of insurers offer contract L ′.
Then insurer 2 (or 3) could gain through a cream-skimming deviation by offering
a contract in the wedge formed by indifference curves V H (H∗) and V L
(
L ′
)
. We
20 This was first pointed out by Villeneuve (2003) and formally proven by Olivella and Vera-Hernandez
(2010).
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emphasize this very standard argument of cream-skimming deviations because this is
precisely the deviation that we could rule out in the presence of a minimum coverage
regulation. This in turn allows us to sustain equilibria with positive profits. Hence, the
same type of legislation has very different effects depending on how restrictive the
legislation is: if it is sufficiently stringent it sustains cross-subsidization from the low
to the high risk (namely a pooling equilibrium); if it is sufficiently weak it sustains
cross-subsidization from all individuals to all insurers.
2.3 General isoprofit lines
To represent equilibria with positive profits, we first identify the corresponding iso-
profit line associated to an arbitrary level, say  ≥ 0, of profits. Obviously, larger
profits require a parallel shift downwards relative to the initial zero isoprofit line. As
mentioned above, we assume individuals split equally among insurers if attracted by
a contract that is offered by more than one insurer. Since isoprofits are depicted in the
space of individual contracts, the shift due to raising profits from zero to  will also
depend on both the number and mix of individuals accepting the contract. In contrast,
we prove below that the slope of the isoprofits only depends on the risk mix.
To ease notation, let
α = /N ,
where N is the number of consumers. We label the isoprofit associated to contracts that
yield profits  by π Jm , where m indicates the number of insurers offering a given set
of contracts in the isoprofit and J ∈ {L , H, P} indicates the risk-mix of the insurees:
low risks only, high risks only, and pooling respectively.
The next lemma establishes the slope and position of strictly positive isoprof-
its. The position is established using, as a reference point, the contract associated
to a positive premium, ˜P > 0, but with zero coverage, c = 0. Hence, (n, s) =
(
w − ˜P, w − ˜P − ). Using the same notation as above, we denote this reference
point by AJm . For instance, if a single insurer is attracting all high risks, then the
reference point is denoted by AH1 and the isoprofit by πH1. Notice that if  is set to
zero then it implies ˜P = 0 and AJm = (w,w − ) = A for all J ∈ {L , H, P} and
m ∈ {1, . . . , M}.
Lemma 1 For any  > 0, point AJM is located at a South West (45o) positive
distance from the status quo point A = (w,w − ). The distance between A and APm
isαm; the distance between A and ALm is αm
λ
; and the distance between A and AHm is
αm
1−λ . Isoprofit line π
Jm has slope − 1−pJpJ for J = {L , H, P} for any m ∈ {1, . . . , M}.
In general, contract APm is always to the North-East of both contract AHm and
contract ALm for any m, because pooling the entire population ensures a larger mass
of consumers to attain the same profit. Instead, the relative position of AHm and
ALm depends on the proportion λ. To illustrate this, Fig. 4 shows the different iso-
profit lines associated to some  > 0 for a number of insurers m = {1, 2, 3} that
are specialized in attracting low-risks. As mentioned, the slopes remain equal to
ds/dn = −(1 − pL)/pL . The distances between each isoprofit and the status quo
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Fig. 4 Isoprofit lines associated to a fixed positive profit by a contract attracting only L-risks, offered by
M = 1, 2, and 3 firms
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Fig. 5 Isoprofit lines associated to a fixed positive profit under various mix of risk and number of firms
(λ = 1/3)
are {α/λ, 2α/λ, 3α/λ}. To provide the full variety of cases, Fig. 5 depicts isoprofit
lines for different risk mixes and different numbers of providers for λ = 1/3. Since
λ < 1/2, the distance between A and AL1 (here, α1/3 = 3α) is larger than the distance
between A and AH1 (here, α1−1/3 = 32α).
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Fig. 6 Coverage regions for a given MCL c∗
2.4 Minimum coverage regulation
This paper focuses on the consequences of a mandatory minimum coverage in the
model, hence we provide the graphical illustration of the region that is restricted due
to the regulation.
To fix ideas, suppose first that a regulation sets a fixed coverage c∗. Only the
premium can vary and the feasible contracts can only be in a given 45◦ line since
changes in premium affect equally both final wealth levels. Notice that under a fully
fixed coverage regulation there is no self-selection possible. If two contracts have the
same coverage and different premia, only the low premium contract is chosen by the
agents.
Consider now that regulation sets a minimum coverage, so that c ≥ c∗. Hence any
contract on or above the 45◦ limit line is legal. Figure 6 illustrates this situation.
The literature has identified minimum standard regulation with restricting insurers
to guarantee a minimum wealth in case of the bad outcome for the Neudeck and
Podczeck (1996), Encinosa (2001), Finkelstein (2004). We also studied this alternative
regulation and our findings still hold (see Appendix C for details).
3 Solving the game
We first present the separating equilibrium, which arises when MCL is not too stringent.
Afterwards we present the pooling equilibrium, which arises when MCL is stringent
enough.
3.1 Sustaining a separating equilibrium
Assume a fixed number of insurers, M ≥ 3, operate in the market. First, we prove a
useful lemma, which provides necessary conditions for a separating CNE.
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Lemma 2 Under a bindingMCL (c∗ > cRSL ), any separating pair of contracts (H, L),
where H is the contract aimed to attract high risks and L the contract aimed to attract
the low risks, is a CNE only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Contract H offers full coverage.
(ii) Contract L lies in the intersection between the minimum coverage line and the
high risk’s indifference curve through H.
(iii) At least two insurers offer L, each one at total profit that we denote by Li .
(iv) Exactly one insurer (henceforth insurer 1 without loss of generality) offers H at
profit that we denote H .
(v) Li ≥ H ≥ 0.
A very important consequence of this Lemma is that equilibrium candidates are
parameterized by the premium offered at H . Since contract H offers full coverage, its
position in the 45◦ line is determined by the premium. This also determines per-capita
profits derived by insurer 1 at H , or πH , as well as its total profits H = (1 − λ) NπH .
Hence we state that the equilibrium candidates are parameterized by H . Once the
position of H is given, we find the high-risk indifference curve going through it.
This curve, together with the minimum coverage line, gives the exact position of L
and also the per capita profits obtained at this contract, π L . The total industry profits
obtained at L are λNπ L which are split among the (M − 1) insurers offering L ,
i.e., Li = λNπ L/ (M − 1). Notice that as H increases (and H slides down the
45◦ line), the corresponding L contract also slides down on the minimum coverage
line. This implies that also π L is increasing as H increases. Hence there exists
a monotonically increasing function φ that relates insurers’ profits in the following
fashion: Li = λNφ
(
H
)
M−1 . It is easy to see that φ (0) takes a positive value. Indeed, if
H = 0 then contract H becomes the same contract as under symmetric information,
H∗. The high risk indifference curve through H∗ intersects the minimum coverage
line (if MCL is binding) to the South West of the contract aimed at low risks under
laissez faire, or LRS (the RS separating equilibrium). Since profits are zero at LRS ,
profits at L must be positive. Notice also that 0 <
∂Li
∂H
= λNφ′
(
H
)
M−1 so that, for
sufficiently small λ and/or sufficiently large M , we also have
∂Li
∂H
< 1. The facts that
λNφ(0)
M−1 > 0 and that
∂Li
∂H
< 1 jointly imply that there exists a unique ˆH such that
Li =
λNφ
(
ˆH
)
M−1 = ˆH , that is, a unique fixed point in the relation between the two
profits. A corollary of Lemma 2 then is that the continuum of equilibrium candidates
is characterized by H in the closed interval
[
0, ˆH
]
. Higher profits at H cannot be
sustained since condition (iv) in Lemma would be violated.
Lemma 2 only provides necessary conditions for existence of a separating equi-
librium. We now construct such equilibria for a given MCL. The fact that there may
exist separating candidates where profits are positive was already shown by NP, but
in the equilibrium they focused on only insurers attracting low risks enjoyed such
profits. We show next that in fact it is possible to support an equilibrium where
Li = H = ˆH > 0.
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Fig. 7 The CNE under Minimum Coverage Legislation. Notes: The double arrows denote the continuum
of pairs that are candidates for a separating equilibrium
Consider Fig. 7, where we give an example using λ = 1/2, pL = 1/5 and pH =
4/5, so that p¯ = 12 15 + 12 45 = 12 and the slope of π P1 is 1− p¯p¯ = 1.
Suppose M = 3. Consider contracts H1a and L2a , where numerical superscripts
denote the number of insurers offering that contract. Insurer 1 is offering contract H1a
(so we say MH = 1) at profits  > 0 while ML = 2 insurers offer contract L2a . As
depicted, these insurers also make profits . To see this, notice first that there exists
a positive distance α from AP1a to A. This distance entails profits per capita equal
to α for any contract in the isoprofit π P1( > 0) stemming from AP1a as long it is
a pooling monopoly. Hence  = αN . Now, AH1a is at twice the distance α. Hence
profits per capita would be doubled at contracts on the isoprofit πH1a stemming
from AH1a if all individuals in the economy were high risks and were attracted by the
same insurer. However, only half of them are high risks. But they are indeed attracted
by insurer 1 only, so insurer 1 makes profits . Finally, notice that AL2a lies at four
times the distance α. Profits per capita are quadrupled at π L2a but only low risks are
attracted (half of the population since λ = 1/2) plus two insurers must share this low
risk population. Hence insurers 2 and 3 make profits  as well. This is our fixed point
in the relationship between Li and 
H . Importantly, we have made an assumption on
the utility function ensuring that no profitable monopolizing pooling deviations exists.
Isoprofit π P1( > 0) does not intersect the low risk indifference curve through L
(labeled V L (L)). Notice also that mandatory enrollment is binding for the low risk. If
insurance was voluntary, the low risk could preferred to remain uninsured at the initial
endowment point A.
123
262 SERIEs (2015) 6:247–278
Let us consider all possible deviations from this CNE candidate. Insurer 1 cannot
deviate to any other contract without either loosing all of its clients (here the fact
that the high-risk incentive-compatibility constraint is binding becomes crucial), or
making less profits, or becoming a pooling monopoly (which we have already shown
is unprofitable). Insurers 2 or 3 cannot offer a contract with a higher premium and the
same coverage without loosing their clients, since more than one insurer is offering
contract L (in other words, the rival disciplines the deviant insurer). If any of these
insurers offers a contract with more coverage or lower premia, it attracts all high risks,
becoming a pooling monopoly. The only alternative deviation left is that either insurer
2 or insurer 3 undercuts insurer 1, that is, it offers full coverage with a slight lower
premium. However, the most that such a deviation can yield is profits , and therefore
is not profitable.
The equilibrium studied by NP is given by the pair of contracts
(
H∗, L2b
)
, where
Li > 0 while 
H = 0. It is easy to check that it is sustained by the same market
structure: insurer 1 offers H∗ while two insurers offer L2b. However, notice that now
one can have any arbitrary number of insurers offering L2b since it is always the case
that 0 = H < Li so condition (v) in the lemma is always satisfied. Note that Li
is lower than under the previous CNE, but positive and therefore higher than under
laissez-faire. This is the other extreme case in the continua of CNE candidates. To
ensure that no profitable pooling deviation exists we have depicted the zero isoprofit
line associated to the zero profit pooling contract, which stems from point A. Notice
that the low risk indifference curve trough L2b does not intersect this isoprofit.
As we did for the RS separating equilibrium (or laissez faire) we now use our
definitions to express this result more formally:
Proposition 1 Suppose that  = {1, 2, 3}. Under a sufficiently weak MCL it is
possible to construct at least two CNE. One is given by ∗ = {L2a, H1a} and
g∗ (1) =
(
H1a, 0, (1 − λ) N); g∗ (2) = g∗ (3) =
(
L2a, λN2 , 0
)
; where all insur-
ers make the same profits  > 0. The other equilibrium is given by ∗ = {L2b, H∗}
and g∗ (1) = (H∗, 0, (1 − λ) N ); g∗ (2) = g∗ (3) =
(
L2b, λN2 , 0
)
; where only
insurers 2 and 3 make profits 0 < ′ < .21,22
21 Assumptions 1 and 2 do not preclude multiplicity of equilibria in terms of permutations among insurers.
Indeed, for each of the two equilibria in Proposition 1 any of the three firms could take the role of firm 1.
However, all these equilibria are equivalent in terms of social welfare and consumer surplus.
22 In terms of this proposition, relaxing Assumption 2 (equal shares among equal contracts) is innocuous
for the first equilibrium but not for the second. Take the first equilibrium, where insurer 1 attracts all high
risks with contract H1a at positive profits per enrollee and insurers 2 and 3 attract all low risks with contract
L2a at positive profits per enrollee. Importantly, the three firms make the same total profits  > 0 under
Assumption 2. Relax now Assumption 2 by considering the possibility that, despite low risk individuals
being indifferent between insurers 2 and 3, insurer 3 attracts less low risks than insurer 2. This implies that
insurer 3’s total profits are smaller than insurer 2’s and therefore also smaller than insurer 1’s. This cannot
be part of an equilibrium since then insurer 3 would undercut the contract offered by insurer 1, thereby
increasing its profits. In contrast, take the second equilibrium in the proposition, where insurer 1 is now
making zero profits. Then additional equilibria (where insurer 2 attracts fewer low risks than insurer 3)
exist. Insurer 3 cannot undercut insurer 2 because by doing so he would attract all high risks at a contract
that yields loses per high risk enrollee. Insurer 3 can neither undercut insurer 1 since insurer 1 is already
making zero profits. Hence, even if one restricts attention to equilibria where firm 1 makes zero profits,
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Also in Fig. 7 we have depicted the continuum of equilibrium candidates, that is,
the pairs of contracts fulfilling the necessary conditions spelled in Lemma 2. They are
stressed by two thick double pointed arrows. For each contract in the arrow at the 45◦
line, aimed at high risks, the corresponding incentive compatible contract aimed at
low risks is found in the arrow at the minimum coverage line. Notice that it is always
the case that per insurer profits are larger at the L contract than in the H contract.
This analysis has been carried out for a specific level of minimum coverage. For
lower coverage level the analysis remains intact. Also, it does for larger MCL as
long as the set contracts
(
L2a, H1a
)
associated with the fixed point Li
(
H
) = H
satisfies that no profitable pooling deviation exists. This will be the case as long as the
minimum coverage is not too high. In the next section we show that for a sufficiently
large MCL the unique MCL is a pooling equilibrium.
To conclude, we have shown that a weak MCL could have unintended results in
this market. All insurers may obtain positive profits and all risks may be worse off as
compared to the laissez faire. Whereas NP already warned that introducing a MCL
did not necessarily imply a cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks (in their
equilibrium high risks enjoy the same contract as under laissez faire), we point out
that the outcome could be even worse: all individual types cross subsidize all insurers.
This is the case in the first equilibrium of the two described in Proposition 1. Notice,
moreover, that the two equilibria in Proposition 1 are Pareto-ranked for insurers: all
insurers prefer the first equilibrium to the second. This stresses our caveat for the
combination of minimum coverage and mandatory enrolment legislation: not only
redistribution between risks fails to materialize (as we still have a separating equilib-
rium), but also insurers could coordinate on an equilibrium where both low and high
risks are worse-off as compared to laissez-faire.
3.2 Sustaining a pooling equilibrium
Suppose that the MCL is stringent enough so that the crossing between the minimum
coverage line and the high risk indifference curve at H∗, or V H (H∗), lies exactly
at the zero pooling isoprofit line. This situation is depicted in Fig. 8. This level of
MCL, c∗ = cP , is the lowest mandatory coverage possible consistent with a pooling
equilibrium. Notice that the separating candidate (H∗, L) is still a CNE as long as
at least two insurers offer contract L . But all insurers offering L is also a pooling
equilibrium. The reason is simple, the usual cream skimming deviations are ruled out
by the MCL.
As the MCL becomes even more stringent, say c∗ = c′ > cP , the separating
candidate (the pair (H∗, L ′) in Fig. 8) is no longer robust to a pooling deviation,
namely a contract in the interior of the segment PL ′, which yields positive profits. In
that case the only CNE is the pooling contract (contract P in Fig. 8). In this case the
Footnote 22 continued
multiple equilibria arise if one relaxes Assumption 2. Notice however, that of all these equilibria entail the
same set of outstanding contracts and are therefore equivalent in terms of aggregate welfare and consumer
surplus. We thank the referee for pointing this out to us.
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Fig. 8 The Pooling Equilibrium under Minimum Coverage Legislation. Notes: For a MCL at c∗ = cP
there exist two equilibria: one is given by the separating pair of contracts {H∗, L}, the other by pooling
contract {L}. For a MCL at c∗ = c′ > cP , the only equilibrium is given by pooling contract {P}, since
the only separating candidate {H∗, L ′} is not robust to a pooling deviation by Firm 1 in the interior of the
segment PL ′
redistributive aim is perfectly fulfilled: high risks are cross subsidized by the low risks
and all insurers make zero profits.
4 An entry game
This section extends the model to allow for an endogenous number of insurers. In
Stage 1, a large set of potential insurers simultaneously decide whether to enter or
not and the contract offered if entering. If an insurer enters he pays a fixed entry cost,
denoted by F > 0 as in Smart (2000). Thus, the set of entrants  becomes endogenous
in this game. The rest of the game proceeds as in previous game: individuals choose
among the available contracts. Formally, assume that there is large set of potential
entrants P . Each of these potential entrants chooses an element in {∅} ∪ 2+, where
choosing ∅ represents the “do not enter” option, and (n, s) ∈ 2+ represents the option
“enter with contract (n, s)”. As before, once a potential entrant has decided to enter
with a given contract he cannot withdraw that contract and must accept any individual
choosing it. We let  be the set of insurers that choose to enter and  = {Si }i∈ be
the set of different outstanding contracts in the beginning of stage 2. All possible pairs
{,} are in the set E . Function g :  →  ×N2 assigns, to each insurer k in
, one of the contracts Sk in  and two natural numbers: the number of individuals
of type L and the number of individuals of type H that will accept insurer k’s contract.
We also impose Assumptions 1 and 2 here. We can now give our equilibrium notion.
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Definition 2 In the Entry Game, the pair
{
{
∗, ∗∗
}
,
{
g
}
{,}∈E
}
constitutes
an Entry Game Competitive Nash Equilibrium (ENE) if
(i) (Second stage) For every {,} ∈ E , function g is consistent with indi-
viduals choosing one of their best contracts in  as well as Assumptions 1 and
2.
(ii) (First stage) (ii-1) No insurer in ∗ expects negative profits in
{
∗, ∗∗
}
given
g∗
∗ ; (ii-2) no insurer not in 
∗ expects positive profits by offering a contract
S′ ∈ 2+ given g′ , with ′ = ∗{∗} ∪
{
S′
}
; and (ii-3) no insurer k in ∗
expects larger profits by offering a contract S′′ ∈ 2+ given g′′ , with ′′ =
[
∗{∗}/
{
S∗k
}
]
∪ {S′′}, than in {∗, ∗∗
}
given g∗
∗ .
Unfortunately, it can be shown that no ENE exists under laissez faire . A natural
way to restore existence of equilibrium would be to assume some degree of mar-
ket power. However, Bates et al. (2012) found no evidence of market power in the
health insurance market. In the theoretical literature some authors have explored cer-
tain degree of differentiation between firms. Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2007) and
Jack (2006) study product differentiation in markets with adverse selection and com-
petitive screening. However, all of these articles assume horizontal differentiation à
la Hotelling with no entry of firms along the linear city. To the best of our knowledge
there is no research exploring differentiation with entry à la Salop. Moreover, Mimra
and Wambach (2014) in a recent survey of RS models never discuss entry or exit of
firms. We think that studying the entry and exit of firms and the existence of ENE
under laissez faire is an interesting question but beyond the focus of this paper.
Nevertheless, the MCL can overturn this non-existence result. In fact we have
already seen an example. Recall that in Fig. 7 we depicted the equilibrium contract
pair
(
H1a, L2a
)
, where minimum coverage ensures the same (variable) profits  > 0
for all insurers, and exactly two insurers offer contract L2a . If fixed cost is exactly
equal to  we have an ENE. We now provide a more complete characterization of
such equilibria.
For a given fixed entry cost F , the contract aimed at the high risk offers full coverage
at a premium that ensures that the only insurer offering it, insurer 1, recovers F . Denote
the indifference curve byV H (H1). The M−1 ≥ 2 other insurers, say insurers 2−i with
i = 1, . . . , M ; attract all the low risks with a contract L2−i satisfying the binding high-
risk incentive compatibility constraint, and coverage exactly satisfying the regulation.
The actual number of insurers offering that can be sustained in equilibrium and the
total profits each insurer makes, which need not be zero, depends on how strict the
minimum coverage regulation is.
Figure 9 illustrates the candidate for several positions of the minimum coverage c∗.
The origins of the isoprofits for insurers 2− i, i = 1, . . . , M are given in the Lemma 1.
Given the contract H1 and a minimum coverage c∗ between c∗1 (included) and c∗2
(excluded), one insurer finds profitable to specialize in low-risks. Denote by x the
intersection between the minimum coverage line and the indifference curve V H (H1).
Obviously, x is in segment L1 − L2 and is an incentive compatible contract intended
for low-risks. Importantly, this contract yields positive profits as long as the contract
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Fig. 9 The entry game
is offered by a single insurer only. If more than one insurer offer x , the market will
yield losses to all insurers specialized in low-risks.
In the initial case of c∗ ∈ [c∗1, c∗2[, where a single insurer specialized in low-risks,
there are profitable deviations. Basically, for any given contract x that yields zero
profits with a single insurer, there is a deviation x ′ along V H (H1) that is slightly
to the left in segment L1 − L2 that yield positive profits. Of course, x ′ allows for a
potential entrant to undercut and monopolize the market, ruling out the existence of
separating equilibrium in this range of minimum coverage.
As minimum coverage increases, there comes a point where two insurers attracting
low risks fit in the market. Following the same construction, given a contract H1 and a
minimum coverage c∗ ∈ [c∗2, c∗3[, denote by y the intersection between the minimum
coverage line and the indifference curve V H (H1). Now, the regulation generates
enough profits for two insurers offering contract y that falls into the segment L2 − L3.
The reason is that as the minimum coverage increases, the contracts intended for low-
risks start making positive profits. Since now two insurers are offering contract y, if
one of them tries to make additional profits it will either attract high risks or will lose
all clients. Note that this competitive effect only exists with two or more active insurers
specialized in low-risks. Therefore, the pair of contracts (H1, y) is a separating Nash
equilibrium.
As the minimum coverage keeps increasing, more insurers could fit into the market,
replicating the case above with more insurers, under fixed costs and endogenous entry.
However, there is high enough minimum coverage that allows for profitable pooling
deviations. In this regard, notice that the parameter configuration in Fig. 9 ensures that
the pair (H1, LM )–H1 is not depicted– is robust to pooling deviations (a monopolizing
pooling contract must lie above the low risk indifference curve through any of the
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points in the H -risk indifference curve, which implies that they are also above the
zero-isoprofit line associated to such deviation).
5 Empirical support
Although this paper is primarily a theoretical contribution, we provide empirical sup-
port for our single-contract competition assumption. We also refer to Finkelstein
(2004), who find evidence consistent with the predictions of our model.
Regarding the single-contract competition assumption, for markets with available
plan-level data we show that (1) insurers specialize in attracting a single risk type
(even if they are offering a menu of contracts), and (2) insurers offering a single type
of contract are able to survive in the long run. Several hypotheses has been explored
in the literature to explain this specialization. First, large costs of bargaining with
specialized networks make less attractive to serve all types inducing health providers
to switch from hospitals (who serve all risk types) to specialized healthcare centers.23
Similarly, insurers might also see profitable to specialize in one risk type since bar-
gaining with many specialized providers decrease the profitability of serving all types
of risk. Second, the large transaction and screening costs at the insurer level make it
less attractive to serve all types, as pointed out by Pauly (2012) who states that “of
course managed competition wanted to take risk variation out of the problem, but I
strongly suspect, based on page after page in the ACA, that doing so is more trouble
than it’s worth”. Third, the screening menu may entail a very asymmetric coverage
among customers within the same insurance company, causing a negative perception
of the provider by society (McFadden et al. 2012).
(1) Evidence on insurers specializing in a dominant plan serving a single-risk type.24
The first piece of evidence can be found in Bundorf et al. (2012), who study a market
where two insurers offer health plans to employees of mid-size firms. Although each
insurer is offering a menu of two plans, each insurer attracts a single risk type only.
Comparing the characteristics of the two dominant plans and their market shares in
Table 1, one concludes that the non-integrated insurer, N , serves the riskier employees
and the cheaper integrated insurer, I , serves the less risky employees, consistent with
the observed price gap in fees due to the greater managed-care limitations of insurer
I relative to N .25
The second piece of evidence to support single-contract competition can be found
in the prescription drug insurance market, Medicare Part D. Based on data of Decarolis
(2015), we find 19 insurers offering just a single contract.26 Moreover, we observe
many insurers specialized in one contract type despite of offering multiple contracts.
23 Tiwari and Heese (2009), Schneider et al. (2008), Vanberkel et al. (2012) and Mahar et al. (2011).
24 We say that a plan is dominant if it covers more than 75 % of the insurer’s customers.
25 Moreover, employees enrolled at the dominant plan in insurer I are younger relative to insurer N . Insurers
were not conditioning their contracts on the age of each individual employee, since the intermediary between
the insurers and the employees “instructed insurers to bid assuming they were covering all workers within
the insurer” (p. 3226).
26 Appendix D presents the 46 insurer-year combinations of these single contract organizations between
2006 and 2013.
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Table 1 Plan enrollment and premia in Bundorf et al. (2012)
Insurer
N I
HMO PPO HMO POS
Monthly bid per employee 307 332 260 276
Monthly contribution per employee 45 73 38 58
Market share 22.94 7.38 58.72 10.96
% in the Dominant Contract 75.66 84.27
Source: Bundorf et al. (2012), Tables 2 and 3
Table 2 Medicare Part D specialization of United Health Group, Inc
Year Total enrollment Basic enrollment % of Dominant contract
2007 2,610,634 2,453,322 93.97
2008 2,677,232 2,516,105 93.98
2009 2,797,029 2,513,332 89.86
2010 2,878,847 2,775,466 96.41
2011 3,217,081 3,114,839 96.82
2012 3,255,185 3,147,307 96.69
Source: Own calculations based on Decarolis (2015)
We distinguish basic and enhanced plans that attract different risk types in Medicare
Part D following the regulator (CMS) who has defined the two plan types based on the
official standard plan.27 A clear and very relevant example of this is shown in Table 2,
which reports that United Health Group-one of the largest insurer in the US- has been
consistently specialized in basic plans between 2007 and 2012.
(2) Evidence on insurers offering a single type of contract are able to survive in the long
run. Also in Medicare Part D, we find that 61 insurers specialized in basic plans and
34 insurers specialized in enhanced plans (including large insurance companies like
Blue Cross and Blue Shield). This evidence suggests that the business strategy based
on specialization is financially sound and that the presence of competitors offering
menus has not put the specialized insurers out of the market. 28
Finally, we have found regional markets where most insurers are specialized in a
single contract type and non-specialized insurers represent a small market share of
the enrollment. Namely, if we consider the Maine and New Hampshire region in 2010
(see Table 3 below) specialized insurers attracted about 95 % of the Medicare Part D
enrollees in this region.
27 Basic plans must be actuarially equivalent to the standard plan (but allowing for different deductibles or
cost sharing structure), enhanced plans must exceed the actuarially equivalent of the standard plan.
28 See Appendix D for the list of insurers and the respective number of years of specialization. Regard-
ing the market shares, the specialized insurers represent about half of the Medicare Part D enrollees on
average between 2006–2013. Insurers specialized in basic plans have a 35.2 % market share while insurers
specialized in enhanced plans have a 15.6 % market share.
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Table 3 Medicare Part D specialization in Maine and New Hampshire (2010)
Parent
organization
Basic plan
total
Total
enrollment
% Dominant
plan
Market
shares
United Health Group, Inc. 53.720 54.935 97.8 53.9
CIGNA 3.059 3.205 95.4 3.1
Universal American Corp. 1.585 2.208 71.8 2.2
Parent
organization
Enhanced plan
enrollment
Total
enrollment
% Dominant
plan
Market
shares
WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 148 5.298 97.2 5.2
Aetna Inc. 86 1.432 94.0 1.4
Torchmark Corporation 43 551 92.2 0.5
Wellpoint, Inc. 1.175 13.071 91.0 12.8
Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 70 764 90.8 0.7
Coventry Health Care Inc. 2.771 16.828 83.5 16.5
Health Net, Inc. 46 251 81.7 0.2
CVS Caremark Corporation 447 1.637 72.7 1.6
Humana Inc. 509 1.798 71.7 1.8
Source: Own calculations based on Decarolis (2015)
On the empirical literature studying minimum coverage regulations, Finkelstein
(2004) focuses on the effects of minimum standards in the Medigap market that took
place during the late 70’s. She finds evidence of a substantial decrease in the (voluntary)
enrollment, especially for the most vulnerable population. This stress the importance
of the assumption on mandatory enrollment in our model.
Finkelstein also finds a change in the nature of equilibrium from separating to
pooling equilibrium. Her findings are along the same lines as our model and NP.
6 Conclusions
Using the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we have shown that a minimum
coverage legislation (MCL) may have undesirable effects on the market. Namely, rather
than implementing a desired cross-subsidization among individuals, it may benefit the
insurers and make all individuals worse off. This will be that case if the binding MCL
is sufficiently weak. For instance, in Obamacare, the minimum coverage is determined
by the so called Bronze Plan. Our results imply that, in the context of our model, if
this plan is not too demanding then Obamacare could have anti-competitive effects.
For sufficiently stringent MCL we recover the desired result: a pooling equilibrium
with zero profits becomes the unique equilibrium of the game. In doing this, we have
abstained from using non-Nash equilibrium notions and we obtain a much more precise
prediction on the market structure arising once the MCL is established.
It remains for further research to build a model of entry that can satisfactorily
endogeneize the number of insurers. We have made a small step in this direction by
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proposing such a game and proving existence of a competitive-Nash equilibrium with
entry for some intermediate range for the minimum coverage. Alas, the nonexistence
of Nash equilibria under laissez faire impedes any normative judgements on the
desirability of the legislation in the entry game proposed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A: Change of variable
Recall that if an individual has purchased a contract (˜P, c), his potential wealth out-
comes are s = w −  − ˜P + c if sick, and n = w − ˜P if healthy. Notice that these
two equations are independent of type. It is easy to check that these two equations can
be expressed as ˜P = w − n and c = s − n + . Denote by pi the risk probability
of group i ∈ {H, L} and by p¯ = λpL + (1 − λ)pH , the risk probability of the entire
population.
An insurer attracting risk type i with contract
(
˜P, c
)
expects to obtain
πi (˜P, c) = ˜P − pi c. (7)
Using the previous expression for c and ˜P we can rewrite the expression for expected
profits as a function of final wealth (n, s) as follows:
πi (n, s) = w − n − pi (s − n + ) . (8)
Similarly, for an insurer attracting an unbiased mix of both risks expects to obtain
π(˜P, c) = λ (˜P − pLc
) + (1 − λ) (˜P − pHc
)
= ˜P − (λpL + (1 − λ) pH ) c = ˜P − p¯c. (9)
That can be expressed as function final wealth as follows:
π(n, s) = w − n − p¯ (s − n + ) .
Appendix B: Proofs of all Lemmata and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Step 1Change of variable given a contract
(
˜P, c
)
. Recall that s = w− ˜P−+c
and that n = w − ˜P . Solving these two equations for ˜P and c yields
˜P = w − n (10)
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and
c = s − n + . (11)
Step 2. Isoprofits associated to  > 0
Take a single insurer attracting all individuals of type H with contract
(
˜P, c
)
. The
isoprofit is given by N (1 − λ) (˜P − pHc
) = . By using α = /N , (10) and (11),
we can rewrite the expression as the explicit formula
s = w − n (1 − pH ) − pH −
α
1−λ
pH
. (12)
Notice that the slope is 1−pHpH .
29 As for the position of the no-coverage point, we let
c = 0, or using the change of variable, s − n +  = 0, or
n = s + . (13)
Substitute into (12) yields
s = w − (s + ) (1 − pH ) − pH −
α
1−λ
pH
, (14)
or
s = w −  − α
1 − λ .
Replacing into (13) yields
n = w − α
1 − λ .
Take now a single insurer attracting all individuals of type L with contract
(
˜P, c
)
.
Then use (12) substituting 1 − λ by λ and pH by pL :
s = w − n (1 − pL) − pL −
α
λ
pL
.
Notice that the slope is (1 − pL) /pL . As for the position of the No-coverage point:
c = 0, we get n = w − α
λ
and s = w −  − α
λ
. (Notice that if λ = 1 − λ = 1/2 then
the no-coverage locus coincide across types. This is used in the figures.)
Take a single insurer attracting all individuals with (pooling) contract
(
˜P, c
)
. Using
a similar argument as above, and letting p¯ = λpL + (1 − λ) pH , the isoprofit line
becomes
s = w − n (1 − p¯) −  p¯ − α
p¯
,
29 Notice that the zero profit does not go through the endowment point A: for a fixed cost F > 0 and
n = w (no insurance and no accident) implies a = w − F
(1−λ)NπH − , a lower point than w − , the final
wealth when accident. How low depends on F
(1−λ)NπH , i.e., on all parameters except the loss.
123
272 SERIEs (2015) 6:247–278
where the slope is 1− p¯p¯ . At zero coverage, the point is given by n = w − α and
s = w −  − α.
Finally, take anm-poly attracting low risks. The isoprofit becomes Nm λ
(
˜P − pLc
) =
. Use α = /N , (10) and (11) to get
s = w − n (1 − pL) − pL −
αm
λ
pL
.
The slope is (1 − pL) /pL and the No coverage point becomes n = w − αmλ , s =
w −  − αm
λ
.
We compare the status quo point n = w, s = w−  with each of these no-coverage
 isoprofit points to obtain the proposition. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof We use Fig. 10 to illustrate this result.
Part (i) Take a inefficient contract like h in Fig. 10. Any insurer offering h can deviate
to contract h′ that covers more and costs more but leaves the high risks indifferent, so
that IC is preserved. Contract h′ yields more profits.
Part (ii) The contract aimed at low risks should not be preferred to H by the high
risks and also should satisfy the MCL. Therefore, it must lie on or above the minimum
coverage line as well as on or above the indifference curve V H (H). Consider first
contract x in Fig. 10, which is neither in curve V H (H) nor in the minimum coverage
line. A small deviation in the direction towards the crossing L (as indicated by the
arrow) will yield almost the same, albeit lower, profits but it will monopolize all low
risks and attract no high risks. If x was exactly on either V H (H) or the minimum
coverage line but not in L , a small approach towards L will be a profitable deviation
for the same reasons.
Part (iii) Suppose by contradiction that a single insurer offers L . This insurer could
raise premium while maintaining the same coverage. This would be legal and preserve
Fig. 10 Lemma 2
H
x
L 
hh’
c* > cL
VH(H) 
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separation (since the incentive compatibility constraint for the low risks is slack and
the high risks’ one is reinforced) while profits would increase.
Parts (iv) and (v) If no insurer was offering H then L would become a pooling
contract. Let us now prove that no more than one insurer can be offering and that
H ≤ Li .
Suppose first thatH > 0. Suppose by contradiction that two insurers were offering
H . Then one of them could gain by undercutting the other, that is, by offering a
contract slightly cheaper than H . This would preserve separation (since the incentive
compatibility constraint for the low risks is slack and the high risks’ one is reinforced)
and profits would be almost doubled. Suppose by contradiction that 0 ≤ L < H
and at least two insurers offer L . Then one of these insurers gains by undercutting
insurer 1, that is, by offering a contract H ′ that offers the same coverage as H at a
slightly lower premium, so that it obtains H − ε > L . Separation is preserved in
this undercutting since the IC of the low risks is slack.
Suppose now that H = 0 . It is obvious that L < 0 = H cannot be part of an
equilibrium (just let one of the insurers offering L deviate to an arbitrarily expensive
premium). Hence L ≥ H = 0. Suppose that more than one insurer offers H . Then
one of these insurers would gain by offering instead contract L . This would preserve
separation and yet this insurer would now make positive profits. unionsq
Appendix C: Minimum net coverage legislation
This appendix shows that the main results are robust to consider the alternative reg-
ulation that sets a fixed wealth when sick. Formally, suppose regulation sets a fixed
wealth when sick, that is, s = s∗. Then we can write s = w −  + c − P = s∗. Since
w and  are exogenous, this defines a one-to-one relationship between premium and
coverage given by c = s∗ + P +  − w. If an insurer raises P by x dollars, then the
coverage must be raised by the same amount. Graphically, this implies the combina-
tion of two shifts: a downward South West shift that reflects the increase in premium
affecting both states of nature; and an upward shift reflecting the increase in coverage
that only takes place in the sick state. Since individual’s final wealth when healthy is
n = w− P , the previous finding implies n = w−(w −  + c − s∗) = −c+s∗, that
is consistent with horizontal changes in the final wealth space, as depicted in Fig. 11.
We refer to the horizontal locus associated to s = s∗ as “the minimum net coverage
line at s∗” (MNCL).30
The possibility to sustain equilibria where all insurers obtain positive profits also
holds under this regulation. In short, the same line of arguments apply. Let us start by
showing in Fig. 12 that the equilibrium suggested by NP, where only insurers attracting
low risks make positive profits, can also be sustained as a CNE. The equilibrium set of
contracts is (Hnp, Lnp). Notice that a insurer offering contract Hnp attracts high risks
only at zero profits. Insurers offering Lnp only attract low risks and make some posi-
tive profits per insuree. Only a single insurer can be offering Hnp, however, given two
30 We thank Mathias Kiffman for this suggestion.
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n 
s = s*
Higher Net Coverage Region (s > s*)
Lower Net Coverage Region (s < s*)
ΔP
ΔP
Δc
s 
Fig. 11 Net coverage regions for a given MNCL s∗. Notes: To preserve a given level of wealth when sick
s∗ after a premium increase P requires an equal increase in coverage c
s
n 
A
H*= Hnp 
LRS
πL=0
V* 
πH = 0 πP = 0
Hoo
Loo Lnp
MNCL
πH > 0 
Voo
πL00>>0
πLnp>0
Fig. 12 Sustaining equilibrium with positive profits under MNCL. Notes. (Hoo, Loo) is an equilibrium set
of contracts as long as (i) only Firm 1 offers Hoo; (ii) a number of firms ML > 2 offer contract Loo; (iii)
ML is small enough that each firm offering Loo shares a fraction of total industry profits at Loo, which is
at least as large as the profits obtained by Firm 1
insurers one of them would have a gain by offering Lnp instead. The rest of insurers
offer contract Lnp. There are no constraints on how many insurers are in the market to
sustain this equilibrium. However, to rule out pooling deviations we require (as usual)
that the proportion of low risks be small enough. This is ensured in Fig. 12.
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Let us now show that, as under the same MNCL legislation, other equilibria exist.
Take the contract pair (Hoo, Loo) in Fig. 12. Suppose a single insurer, say insurer 1,
is offering contract Hoo and the rest of insurers offer contract Loo. This is an CNE
pair of contracts as long as the total profits at each of the insurers offering Loo is at
least as large as the profits obtained by insurer 1. This implies that the total number
of insurers in the market cannot be too large, as the per-insurer profits at Loo would
become too small. In that case one of these insurers would deviate by undercutting
insurer 1, that is, by offering a contract slightly cheaper than Hoo instead. Notice that
the restriction on the proportion of low risks is more stringent than when sustaining
NP’s CNE.
Appendix D: Evidence of single contract specialization
The plan-level enrollment data of Medicare Part D is from Decarolis (2015). We
focus on the enrollees who choose freely their prescription drug plan. Therefore, we
excluded the poor LIS population, and we studied only the proper Part D Prescription
Drug Plans (PDP), so we dropped MA plans and all the employer and other special
plans (Tables 4, 5, 6).
Table 4 Insurers offering a
single contract
Source: Own calculations based
on Decarolis (2015)
Parent organization Years
America’s Health Choice Medical Plans 2
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona 2
BlueCross BlueShield of Louisiana 6
California Physicians’ Service 1
Capital BlueCross 1
EmblemHealth, Inc. 5
Geisinger Health System 2
HIP, Health Plan of New York 1
Hawaii Medical Service Association 1
Health Alliance Medical Plans 2
Health Alliance Plan (HAP) 2
HealthNow New York Inc. 7
Lifetime Healthcare, Inc. 1
PriorityHealth 2
Promedica Health System 1
Rocky Mountain Health Maintenance, Inc 2
Spectrum Health System 5
The ODS Companies (ODS) 1
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 2
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Table 5 Insurers specialized in basic plans
Organization Years Organization Years
America’s Health Choice Medical Plans 2 HealthMarkets, Inc. 1
AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan 1 HealthNow New York Inc. 7
BCBS MN, MT, NE, ND, WY, and others 4 HealthSpring, Inc. 4
BCBS RI & BCBS MA and others 2 HIP, Health Plan of NY 2
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 4 Horizon BC Blue Shield of NJ 1
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona 2 Independence Blue Cross 3
Blue Shield of California 1 Lifetime Healthcare, Inc. 1
BlueCross BlueShield of Louisiana 8 Longs Drug Stores Corporation 2
BlueCross BlueShield of South Carolina 2 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 2
Bravo Health, Inc. 3 Member Health, Inc. 1
California Physicians’ Service 1 Midwest Health Plan, Inc. 1
Cambia Health Solutions, Inc. 6 Munich American Holding Corp 4
Capital BlueCross 1 NewQuest Health Solutions LLC 2
CareFirst, Inc. 8 NMHC SYSTEMS, INC 1
Carolina Care Plan, Inc 1 PacifiCare Life and other 1
CIGNA 4 Presbyterian Healthcare Services 3
Coventry Health Care Inc. 1 PriorityHealth 2
CVS Caremark Corporation 1 Promedica Health System 1
Dean Health Systems Inc. 1 QCC Insurance Company 1
Educators Mutual Insurance Association 1 Rocky Mountain HM 2
Elder Health, Inc. 2 Scott and White 1
EmblemHealth, Inc. 8 Sierra Health Services, Inc 2
Envision Insurance Company 3 Spectrum Health System 5
Express Scripts, Inc. 1 Sterling Insurance Group 1
Fox Insurance Company 5 The ODS Companies (ODS) 1
Geisinger Health System 3 Torchmark Corporation 2
Hawaii Medical Service Association 1 UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 7
Health Alliance Medical Plans 3 Uni. of Pittsburgh Medical Center 5
Health Alliance Plan (HAP) 2 WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 3
Health Care Service Corporation 5 Windsor Health Group 7
Health Net, Inc. 3
Source: Own calculations based on Decarolis (2015)
Table 6 Insurers specialized in
enhanced plans
Organization Number of years
Aetna Inc. 4
Aultman Health Foundation 1
BCBS RI & BCBS MA & BCBS VT & Wellpoint 2
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas 5
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan 8
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Table 6 continued
Source: Own calculations based
on Decarolis (2015)
Organization Number of Years
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 3
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Car 8
Blue Shield of California 3
California Physicians’ Service 3
Capital BlueCross 3
Capital District Physicians’ Health Pla 1
Citrus Health Care, Inc. 2
Coventry Health Care Inc. 2
Dean Health Systems Inc. 2
Envision Insurance Company 2
Geisinger Health System 1
Health First 1
Highmark Inc. 2
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New J 4
Lifetime Healthcare, Inc. 1
Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 2
QHP Group, Inc. 1
Quality Health Plans, Inc. 1
Rocky Mountain Health Maintenance , Inc 2
Scott and White 2
Sierra Health Services, Inc 1
TAHMO, Inc. 2
Torchmark Corporation 6
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 1
Universal Health Care Inc. 1
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 1
WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 3
Wellpoint, Inc. 1
Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins Corpor 3
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